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Respectfully eating or not eating
Putting food at the centre of Religious Studies
GRaham haRvey 
With reference to data drawn from both ethnology and ethology, I argue that studying food-ways does not merely add additional information about religions, but enables better under-
standing of religion. Rather than defining religion cognitively in relation to beliefs and believing 
(modernist tropes that have shaped the study of religion) I explore the effect of defining religion in 
relation to the questions, ‘what do you eat?’ and ‘with whom do you eat?’
Food is more than a pinch of additional spice among the many topics avail-
able to scholars of religion. Researching foodways (everything related to the 
production and consumption of food) incites us to re-direct our attention to 
vital and generative matters among all religions. It reinforces the need for ver-
nacular, material and performative issues to be placed firmly at the centre of our 
discipline. 
If I were to push a claim to its extreme limits, I could assert that religion 
begins with eating. It certainly has much to do with what people eat or avoid 
eating, and with whom they eat or avoid eating. The intimate violence required 
in order to eat other living beings is at the heart of the relational engagement 
with the world that is life. Acts of consumption are allowed or constrained by 
religion as they are braided into both value systems and performative tradi-
tions. As such, food rules are among the quintessential forms of taboo that 
pervade and structure societies and cultures. Foodways are so frequently central 
to religious acts (even if they are insufficiently recognised as such) that they 
may define ‘religion’ as much as they differentiate between religions. Specific 
religions become identifiable, definable and observable when we attend to their 
meals (including their production and their aftermath) and also to feasting, 
fasting and other modes of celebration and abstinence. Perhaps religion (as a 
locus of scholarly attention) ought to be defined not as believing but as eating. 
In this article, I seek to explore and justify these assertions as a challenge to col-
leagues to make a feast out of the topic of religion and food by contemplating 
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‘religion as food’. By way of an extended preface, the following section context-
ualises my main argument by pointing away from believing towards socialising.
Religion is not entirely modernist
Bruno Latour is famous for asserting that ‘we have never been modern’ (1993). 
He means by this that the project of modernity has not succeeded in completely 
shaping the ways in which humans engage with or speak or think about the 
world. We do not entirely separate ‘nature’ from ‘culture’. My assertion that ‘reli-
gion has never been modern’ is offered in that context. I do not mean that reli-
gion is primitive, a foolish irrationality left over from earlier epochs of human 
cultural evolution. Just as Latour’s phrase can be expanded with the acknowl-
edgement that some of us have tried hard to be modern and have even tried to 
impose modernity globally, so religions have tried to be modern. People have 
attempted to fit into the modern system by allowing the word ‘religion’ to label 
private beliefs about matters that are irrelevant to nation states. The United 
Nations declares that there is a universal freedom to believe anything. It allows, 
however, that there are apparently legitimate restrictions on acting on beliefs 
that might challenge the authority of political and public order. Displaying 
markers of religious affiliation too publically is likely to lead one to be identi-
fied as a ‘fundamentalist’ or ‘extremist’. Early modernity’s ‘wars of state making’ 
(which are often mis-identified as ‘wars of religion’) continue wherever people 
are vilified for becoming ‘radical’ or even ‘militant’ about religion (Cavanaugh 
1995, King 2007). In short, when religion means more to people than ‘odd ideas 
that hardly affect relationships with other people’ they are demonstrating that 
religion is not, for them at least, entirely modern. 
The study of religions has, however, far too often been almost completely 
modern. It has colluded with the notion that religion is believing. In research and 
teaching, it has emphasised odd ideas, cognitive process and unusual polemics 
rather than matters of relationship, materiality and performance. When these 
are engaged with, it has usually been as ‘expressions’ or ‘representations’ of prop-
erly religious believing. However, we are now well into an era that emphasises 
the study of religious performance and materiality. We are indebted to books 
with titles like More than Belief (Vásquez 2011) which point us away from pri-
vatised, individualised and interiorised acts of peculiar believing towards social 
acts of embodied, located, performative persons. Religion is no longer solely to 
be conceived of as a kind of mask worn by (Durkheimian) ‘Society’ but may be 
theorised as an aspect of the continuous relational interactions of social beings. 
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Rejecting bland representations
Too often, textbooks about particular religions use dietary matters to give an 
introductory flavour of ways in which people live or practice their religions. 
Or they talk about festival foods or fasts to illustrate the living out of religious 
ideologies and systems. They use words like ‘represent’, ‘manifest’ and ‘express’ to 
indicate that foodways are among the practices which act as the public appear-
ances of (allegedly more definitive) religious ‘beliefs’. While such approaches 
may offer an entrée to the study of lived religion, they remain bland and cannot 
nourish a full understanding. In both deliberate and subtle ways they reinforce 
the all too prevalent idea that religion exists before any actual performance, 
activity or living takes place. In some traditional scholarly approaches, religions 
can appear to be systems of teachings that may be expressed in ritual or daily 
life, represented in costume or art, and/or manifest in architecture, texts and/
or symbols. Religions seem to exist independently of lived realities. Indeed, 
those ‘expressions’ may themselves be represented as only partially matching 
the supposedly normative form of a religion, that is ‘believing’ – as if ‘reli-
gion’ could exist independently of life. Until recently, considerable emphasis 
has been put on excavating these expressions, representations and symbols in 
order to uncover the underlying teachings, ideas or ideologies. It seems to have 
been more important to discover ‘what this religion teaches by encouraging or 
opposing this act’ than to understand what religion is if it is all about eating or 
not eating particular foods, wearing or not wearing particular costumes, talking 
or singing together at agreed times and venues, and so on. 
The ‘turn’ towards vernacular and/or lived religion by scholars of religion 
(especially Leonard Primiano 1995, 2012; and Meredith McGuire 2008) reson-
ates with wider scholarly turns towards performance, embodiment, materiality 
and, most recently, relationality (especially see Vásquez 2011, Harvey 2013). 
Together these emphases and approaches provide a resounding invitation to 
make far more of foodways than using them as mere data to flavour analysis or 
theorising. Rather, in studying ‘religion and food’ we are re-evaluating our dis-
cipline’s focus and approaches. We are attending to what people do in the real 
world. We are analysing and debating the lived realities of human behaviours in 
relation to the larger than human world and cosmos. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I make use of a series of questions that 
have provoked me to think differently about the implications of researching 
religion and food. I begin by contesting existing approaches and move on to 
illustrating potentially more fruitful lines of enquiry. In the next two sections, 
questions about the Christian Eucharist initiate a rethinking of issues that have 
marked or moulded common ways of understanding and studying religion(s). 
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In the first of these sections, an over-emphasis on representation or symbolism 
is traced to Reformation-era disagreements over the Eucharist. Secondly, an 
emphasis on what religious elites do in the Eucharist has distracted us from 
studying the ways in which the majority of Christians perform their religion. 
We have, for example, been led to study interiority and transcendence as defined 
by authorities rather than relationships and interactions as performed by all 
religionists. Since the study of Protestant Christianity has played a definitive 
role in defining and studying all religions, these two issues – over-emphasising 
representation and belief and over-emphasising elites – have had a baleful effect 
on our discipline.
In seeking to provoke more exciting thinking about religion, as well as about 
relationships between religion and food, I then ask some unusual questions. 
Why do only some chimpanzees eat ants or termites? Is ‘doing violence with 
impunity’ the purpose of religious activity everywhere as Te Pakaka Tawhai 
(1988) claimed is true for his Maori community? Should researchers ask their 
hosts or informants, ‘who do you eat?’ rather than ‘what do you believe?’ The 
end result of discussing these questions may be a strengthening of a focus on 
topics that seem familiar (e.g. purity rules and taboo), and could also have been 
achieved by discussing kashrut, halal or other foodways, or by renewing famil-
iarity with Mary Douglas’ Purity and Danger (1992). The virtue of engaging 
with less familiar ways of achieving a similar result is that my aim is both to 
place food (its creation, consumption and consequences) at the absolute cen-
tre of our discipline and to provide better foundations for better scholarly 
approaches to lived religion. The resilience of what we have come to know as 
the ‘world religions paradigm’ demonstrates that it is all too easy to know we 
can do better but all but impossible to move on. Considering religion as food-
ways (rather than merely ‘religion and food’) places our subject matter firmly in 
the context of human interactions with the larger-than-human world. Food is 
not only ‘good to think’, as Claude Lévi-Strauss (1969: 62, 89) said of animals 
as totems, but vital to our living within the community of life, nowhere more 
intimately than in the food chain. 
Bread and body
The question of what Christians eat when participating in the Eucharist is not 
only of historical or theological interest. Neither should it interest those who 
research ‘religion and food’ only because of the surprising variety of ways in 
which Christians make and distribute ‘the host’ or dispose of whatever does not 
get consumed during the ritual. More than this, conflicts over the Eucharist were 
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foundational to the constitution and construction of early modernity. Since this 
evolving modernity has been exported globally to become the domin ant world 
ideology, the results of those conflicts about bread and wine ought to interest 
everyone. The issue is not really ‘what do Christians eat when they participate in 
the Eucharist?’ That is a more theological and sectarian matter than is usefully 
addressed here. Rather, what interests me is the ramifications of those historic 
and continuing disputes in our wider culture, in the construction of ourselves as 
scholars, and in the study of religion(s). 
In early modernity western European Christians structured their commu-
nities around competing understandings about the Eucharist and other ritual 
matters. One of these other matters was the ‘Communion of Saints’. Roman 
Catholics insisted that praying for and being prayed for by the deceased was 
effective and valuable (especially in the presence of relics). Protestants pro-
claimed that at death people either entered heaven or hell and played no role 
(other than as examples) in determining the eternal salvation of their still liv-
ing kin. This was a necessary (to them) implication of the conflict initiated by 
the elevation of an individualised and interiorised notion of ‘faith’ to pre-emi-
nence among Protestants. This shift from ‘faithfulness’ to ‘faith’ or from ‘trust’ 
to ‘believing’ (to encapsulate a complex phenomena briefly) and from ‘church’ 
to ‘believer’ also impacted Christian understandings of the Eucharist. Christian 
relationality was altered by a distancing of the Christian deity from what were 
asserted to be (material) signs, symbols and representations of his (spiritual) 
presence. The bread and wine which transubstantiated into divine body and 
blood as Catholic priests intoned the scriptural and liturgical phrases ‘this is 
my body’ and ‘this is my blood’ became transformative representations (without 
themselves being materially transformed) in Protestant rites. Christian material 
and performance culture changed dramatically and, sometimes, violently. 
As Protestantism diversified so did the ways of explaining or expressing the 
relationship between bread and body. This is familiar territory to most scholars 
interested in religion or in European history. My purpose here is to indicate 
that something profound happened to European (and subsequent colonial and 
global) cultural discourses and performances under the influence of these early 
modern reformations. For one thing, the apparently simple word ‘is’ became 
loaded with increasingly complex freight. If ritualists could no longer say ‘this 
[bread] is my body’ without expecting to be understood to mean complicated 
things about signs, symbols and representations, more everyday uses of the word 
‘is’ caught the same tendency towards convolution. A painting or photograph of 
a person or a scene cannot simply be explained with phrases like ‘this is my wife’ 
or ‘this is my garden’. There is no equivalence. The sign can only be something 
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other than that towards which it points. Much of modernity’s understanding of 
‘art’ begins here. But that is not all. 
It is possible that matters were always more complex than I am suggest-
ing here. I cannot be certain, for example, that ancient paintings or statues of 
Roman emperors were not understood by their first Roman viewers as represen-
tations of a distant ruler or as signs of his authority. Perhaps they were taken to 
be some kind of real presence of the emperor. However, my difficulty in know-
ing what ‘is’ does in those phrases is partly caused by the fact that centuries of 
European enculturation have made the notion of representation ‘natural’ to me. 
I hear the words ‘this is my wife’ or ‘this is the emperor’ but I hear ‘this repre-
sents my wife’ or ‘this signifies the authority of the emperor’. At international 
borders things become a little more complicated because there is supposed to 
be an equivalence between a passport photograph and the person showing it 
to immigration officers . We prove our identities by showing something that 
is somehow understood to be identical to ourselves. An opposite trajectory to 
the reforming insertion of the idea of symbolism or representation into inter-
personal relationships seems to be pursued here. Matters can be even more 
different elsewhere. For example, for (Native American) Zuni traditionalists, 
anyone who makes a koko mask is making a Zuni koko mask. As Pia Altieri 
demonstrates (2000: 139), it is simply not possible to make a copy, replica, 
model or representation of these masks. Since each koko mask is a personal and 
relational being, the act of making a mask is a relational act that employs Zuni 
sacred knowledge and establishes or enriches relations between the maker and 
the koko. The ethnicity or intention of the mask’s maker is irrelevant: if museum 
curators or youth groups make koko masks they are making relations within the 
Zuni world. Any such mask is an authentic Zuni mask and never a mere replica 
or neutral representation.
Changes circulating around the Eucharistic bread and wine are among 
the roots of prevalent, taken-for-granted contemporary definitions of and 
approaches to religion because too many textbooks and introductory courses 
about religion indicate that food, costumes, buildings and ceremonies represent 
religion. They are not themselves ‘religion’ because that is all about the interior 
beliefs (or non-empirical postulations) rather than being actions in a mater-
ial world. Happily, this inherited and misguided approach is being challenged. 
Thinking again about food and religion is pushing forward the project of think-
ing more carefully about lived religion. 
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Wine and tea
In addition to the over-emphasis on interiority brought about by treating 
Eucharistic bread and wine as representations of more ‘spiritual’ realities, the 
study of religion has also colluded with religious elites in largely ignoring 
‘ordin ary people’. Indeed, my use of a single name, ‘the Eucharist’, masks con-
siderable variety and epic conflicts among Christians. It suggests a commonal-
ity belied by the diversity of Christian teaching, understanding, performance 
and debate. While it may be useful to treat these varied rites as the defining 
rituals of Christianity, what they define most clearly is the particular, local, and 
sometimes conflictual nature of plural Christianities in real life. 
In addition, and far more interestingly, if we surrender to the normative 
call to direct our attention towards actions at the altar or table of churches we 
might fail to see the richness of what ‘ordinary’ Christians do as crucial aspects 
of lived Christianity. We might, for instance, mistakenly think that the drinking 
of tea or coffee is utterly separate from the ‘real’ ritual. We may not recognise 
that these seemingly more mundane acts of consumption are integral to estab-
lishing and reinforcing community and even communitas. They might not be 
symbolically rich. They might not represent anything. Few if any ‘believers’ say 
much to researchers about the religious meaning of tea drinking, flower arrang-
ing or many other putatively mundane acts undertaken in churches. However, 
scholars of religion need not follow this lead any more than we should allow our 
attention to be directed by the elite who manipulate bread and wine at the altar. 
Rather, if we consider that religion might have everything to do with communi-
ties eating together, we might place equal or even greater weight on the more 
frequent sharing of tea, coffee or fruit juice than on the less common ingestion 
of small bits of bread and small sips of wine. By all these acts of sharing together 
people become a congregation or community. They also become distinct from 
groups with whom they do not share. This, I believe, is religion and not merely a 
manifestation of religion. Perhaps a dramatically different culinary context will 
help me to develop that thought. 
Chimpanzee diets and religion
The primatologist Jane Goodall says that she is often asked ‘if the chimpanzees 
show any signs of religious behavior’ (2005: 1304). She and other researchers 
from various disciplines have debated evidence of religious behaviours or reli-
gious experiences among chimpanzees. Their approaches and evidence bases are 
admirably surveyed by James Harrod (2014) who advances an argument that 
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chimpanzees do indeed behave in ways that match his ‘non-anthropocentric, 
trans-species definition of religion’ (also see Harrod 2011). That is, chimpanzees 
engage in complex and deliberate behaviours which demonstrate prototypical 
characteristics of religion such as ‘reverence, careful observation, wonder, awe, 
and empathic intimacy’ (Harrod 2014: 9). He could have added evidence relat-
ing to the ‘culinary rites’ which he lists among other ‘possible categories of ritual’ 
but does not illustrate with reference to chimpanzees. 
Evolutionary anthropologists and ‘panthropologists’ have greatly enriched 
understanding of chimpanzee tool use and dietary behaviours. For instance, in 
writing about the ‘Subsistence technology of Nigerian chimpanzees’, Andrew 
Fowler and Volker Sommer (2007) present evidence of complex choices and 
deliberate learning among chimpanzees. Specific tools are made, adapted and 
learnt within particular groups. These are used to obtain particular food sources. 
What interests me is that some chimpanzees use these tools to capture and eat 
ants while others use them to capture and eat termites. Ants and termites are 
available to most chimpanzees but particular communities select or reject them 
as food. Speculating about why this might be the case leads Fowler, Sommer 
and colleagues to write:
it is entirely possible that Gashaka chimpanzees do not consume termites, 
because ‘it is not something that is done here’ (McGrew 2004) – similarly 
to the situation at Mahale/Tanzania, where termites are consumed in one 
community, but not the neighbouring (Whiten et al. 2001). … These pat-
terns are perhaps related to what would be called a ‘food taboo’ in human 
societies. For example, humans in the Gashaka area will not consider eating 
dogs, while this is perfectly acceptable for the same or similar ethnic groups 
just 1 ½ days walk away, across the border in Cameroon (I. Faucher pers. 
comm.). The non-consumption of a perfectly edible food-item would thus 
serve as some sort of group-identifying trait. (Fowler et al. 2011: 482)
Sommer and colleagues are developing this argument about the ‘arbitrary/
non-practical aspect of certain behaviours that assist to create some sort of 
random in-group/out-group identity’ (sometimes with violence) which would 
in human populations often be called ‘taboo’ (Sommer, personal communica-
tion; but also see Sommer and Parish 2010, and Sommer et al., forthcoming). 
That eating particular foods, or wearing particular costumes, or acting in par-
ticular ways is ‘not something that is done here’ seems an excellent summary 
of the negative, boundary policing rules that could be taken to define religion 
in lived reality. The positive version is equally definitive: eating particular foods 
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and wearing particular costumes is exactly the kind of thing that ‘makes us who 
we are’. Indeed, they make otherwise unrelated individuals into a community, 
a ‘we’. Such an argument is familiar to those inspired by Douglas’ Purity and 
Danger (1992). While a remarkable array of explanations have been offered as 
to why some people do not eat some ‘perfectly edible food item’ (e.g. horses, 
pigs, dogs or any meat), Douglas’ argument may be perfectly summed up in 
McGrew’s words: ‘it is not something that is done here’. Those other communi-
ties who seem to make the eating of the same items central to their social rela-
tions or cultural actions act no less randomly or arbitrarily. No one is compelled 
to eat anything simply because it is edible. However, everyone (chimpanzees 
as much as humans) is born into a cultural context with expectations about 
what will be eaten or not eaten. What would otherwise be random becomes 
meaningful only when we understand that to be ‘us’ is to eat or not eat (to 
wear or not wear, to sing or not sing, to dance or not dance, to arrange flow-
ers or not to arrange flowers) in given ways. Those who wish to act (eat, wear, 
sing, dance or arrange flowers) differently must take the consequences or find 
another community. 
If chimpanzees have taboos (which presumably can be broken as well as 
maintained, perhaps at some cost), and if taboos are pervasive among reli-
gions, perhaps chimpanzees are religious. Perhaps taboo and religion are closely 
related terms or even synonyms. If so, to study foodways is to study religion. 
Violence with impunity
Jonathan Z. Smith has famously asserted that religion ‘can be defined, with 
greater or lesser success, more than fifty ways’ (1998: 281). The Maori scholar 
Te Pakaka Tawhai offers what may seem a surprising definition. In relation to 
his people’s traditional knowledge he wrote,
the purpose of religious activity here is to seek to enter the domain of the 
superbeing and do violence with impunity: to enter the forest and do some 
milling for building purposes, to husband the plant and then to dig up the 
tubers to feed one’s guests. Thus that activity neither reaches for redemption 
and salvation, nor conveys messages of praise and thanksgiving, but seeks 
permission and offers placation. (Tawhai 1988: 101)
My Food, Sex and Strangers: Understanding Religion as Everyday Life (2013) 
was initiated by reflection on whether Tawhai’s definition is applicable else-
where. Does ‘doing violence with impunity’ successfully define ‘religion’ beyond 
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the borders of Tawhai’s Ngati Uepohatu homeland at the East Cape of Aotearoa 
New Zealand? It certainly emphasises the links between ritual, food and com-
munity, but far more is involved here than merely adding some more (exotic) 
data. 
Tawhai’s explanation relies on a number of facts. In order to feed guests, one 
must have planted, tended and harvested kumara, sweet potatoes. The intim-
acy of this relationship reciprocates the care afforded to Maori when kumara 
migrated with them to what is now New Zealand. Understanding that plants 
are not inanimate objects or mere resources but personal beings may further 
our appreciation of the fact that digging up the tubers is an act of violence. 
Even if such violence is required by the cultural imperative to feed guests, it 
is not made automatically acceptable. There is nothing neutral about food and 
consumption: it is burdened with ethical and cultural weight. Over and above 
practical concerns about the conservation of plants for future planting, Tawhai’s 
writing points to the structuring and maintenance of relations between humans 
and plants as much as between humans and other humans. Indeed, these sets of 
relationships are entwined. Guest-making rituals are among the most import-
ant Maori cultural activities. They involve the negotiation of taboo statuses and 
relationships. Someone new (like a host or a visitor) or something new (like a 
fresh meeting house) is deemed tapu (as Maori dialect renders ‘taboo’) until 
normalised by deliberate acts. These may include people eating together, as they 
do in the case of guest-making. Thus, social life and cultural interactions could 
not continue without the taking of life in order to produce food. But Tawhai 
describes a world in which ‘social life’ and ‘culture’ do not only include humans 
but embrace a larger-than-human community. 
As Aua, an Iglulik Inuit shaman, told Rasmussen, a Danish explorer and 
ethnographer, in the 1920s:
The greatest peril of life lies in the fact that human food consists entirely of 
souls. All the creatures that we have to kill to eat, all those that we have to 
strike down and destroy to make clothes for ourselves, have souls, like we 
have, souls that do not perish with the body and which must therefore be 
propitiated lest they should avenge themselves on us for taking away their 
bodies. (Rasmussen 1929: 55–6) 
Charles Darwin taught the same truth, albeit without recourse to the notion 
of ‘souls’. The ‘creatures that we have to kill’ are our evolutionary and ecological 
relations, many with flesh, bones, families and activities that look quite like our 
own. Our relationships with other animals are fraught both because of their 
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similarities with and differences from us and also because we (and probably 
they) do not entirely approve of violence and life-taking. Nonetheless, killing is 
necessary. Local context underpins Aua’s emphasis on human kinship with ani-
mals. Tawhai’s evocation of the husbanding of sweet potatoes widens this con-
cern with killing others to include plants. Inuit and Maori are far from alone in 
seeking ways to commit necessary, life-sustaining violence with impunity. We 
could examine a number of other cultural and/or religious lifeways, but ques-
tions about planting and eating invite thoughts about veganism. While some 
vegans justify their chosen diet by citing the sentience of animals or their ability 
to feel pain, others are not convinced that plants are insensate in relevant ways. 
If they are right, veganism may reduce the number of acts of consumption (i.e. 
eating plants directly rather than eating plants-transformed-into-flesh) with-
out ending predatory acts. More to the point, diminishing one’s impact within 
the food chain does not automatically bring about impunity for acts of killing. 
As Tawhai suggests of his Maori community, vegans too might need to ‘seek 
permission and offer placation’ to plants. 
Killing, then, is a crucial element of everyday life in the real world, even 
for those of us who employ others to kill for us. We cannot, even if we wished, 
escape this cycle of violence by ending our own lives because our skin and 
guts are home to myriad lively bacteria (Wade 2008). As inherently symbiotic 
beings, neither our bodies nor our lives and deaths are entirely ‘ours’. We live 
as communal beings even when we are without the company of other humans. 
When we die, many other beings die with (in and on) us. Acknowledging our 
involvement in food chains, and hearing the seemingly ubiquitous decree ‘do 
not kill’, may enable us to recognise the force of Tawhai’s evocative and pro-
vocative proposal that ‘the purpose of religious activity … is doing violence with 
impunity’. If so, the study of foodways takes us to the heart and guts of under-
standing religion as a crucial aspect of human relations with the larger-than-
human world and especially with those other-than-human beings consumed 
by humans. 
Eating with others
As a thought experiment, I wonder what the scholarly study of religion would 
have been like if it had emerged in a culture significantly moulded by any reli-
gion other than Protestant Christianity. If the dominant culture had been that 
of observant Jews would our textbooks invite students to reflect on food choices 
as their principle subject matter? Would researchers meeting new inform-
ants ask ‘what do you eat?’ and/or ‘what do you not eat?’ rather than worrying 
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about odd (i.e. non-secular, non-empirical) beliefs? If our habits of thought and 
behaviour had been shaped by animism (Harvey 2005) rather than modernism 
would we have phrased our questions more relationally, for example as ‘who do 
you eat?’, and attended more closely to inter-species interactions rather than to 
transcendence? 
This is more than an idle speculation to while away some time between 
proper scholarly enquiries. It is part of an effort to contest the modernist 
assumptions and practices that inform and constrain us. It is a test of the taboo 
system of a discipline in which people can be marginalised for ‘believing’ what 
their host communities allegedly believe. A quite different relationship between 
scholars and practitioners could emerge if scholars were to be most interested 
in questions of performance. Our positions (in academia and in religious con-
texts) could be quite different if they were marked by degrees of observance 
(discerned, e.g., by answering ‘what do you eat?’) rather than being tangled up 
in worries about adherence to possible irrationalities. We would be research-
ing and teaching about public, communal, performative, embodied and located 
matters rather than about putatively private and interior ones. We would have 
far easier access to those materialised realms than we do to imaginary worlds of 
imagined believers. I concur with Latour (2010) that we have become believers 
in belief and that, in doing so, we have misunderstood precisely that part of the 
world (a pervasively interactive community) which our discipline is supposed 
to study: religion. 
When we think of religion and of our task as scholars of religion more 
relationally we find that asking ‘what do you eat?’, ‘what do you not eat?’, ‘with 
whom do you eat?’ and ‘with whom do you not eat?’ are vitally important ques-
tions. Foodways are at the heart of the many specific, local and generative taboo 
systems that are taught and, to one degree or another, adopted, adapted, nego-
tiated or resisted by religious people. If we must seek systems, religion begins 
to look like a purity system rather than a belief one. We should not ask about 
cognition but consumption. What rules govern people’s choices of what to eat, 
when, where, how and with whom? 
If we must seek the origins of religion, it seems to me entirely possible that 
religion did indeed begin with eating and not eating. Our first ancestors made 
choices about what to eat long before we were human, probably long before we 
were apes. Being embraided within the relational interactions of the whole com-
munity of life, religion may have begun when people sought permission from 
and expressed gratitude to those other-than-human persons who they wished 
to eat. But this is speculation and I might as easily assert that religion began 
when our first ancestors sought to communicate across species boundaries by 
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singing or otherwise sounding like other species. (If so, religion would fit better 
into Steven Mithen’s [2005] views on the evolution of language and music than 
his brief allusion to cognitive scholarship allows.) I could as easily assert that 
religion began when those same early ancestors erected a pile of rocks or a cairn 
to mark a place of relationship establishing encounter with other-than-human 
persons. Interesting as these possibilities may or may not be, they are not my 
concern. Instead, I want to celebrate the fact that growing numbers of scholars 
are studying what people eat or avoid eating with other people. 
However, I want to push this emergent project further. I want to insist that 
we do not only study ‘religion and food’ but ‘religion as food’. Foodways are 
not just additional spice in our work. They get us to the heart of our subject 
matter . Whether or not you agree with Tawhai and me that religion is about the 
intim ate and necessary violence of eating other living beings does not matter. 
If religions are (as some think) value systems and/or performative traditions, it 
is in the ways in which acts of consumption are allowed or constrained that we 
see them best. If foodways (what gets eaten or avoided with others) is definitive 
of religions, and religions are defined by meals (including their production and 
their aftermath) and by both feasting and fasting (and other modes of abstin-
ence), they must also define ‘religion’. If what people eat or avoid eating with 
other people defines the relational engagement with the world that we label 
‘religion’, then our discipline should be evaluated according to its success or 
failure to analyse people’s foodways. 
Dr Graham Harvey is Head of Religious Studies at the Open University, UK. He has conducted research among 
Jews, Pagans and indigenous peoples. His most recent book is Food, Sex and Strangers: Understanding 
Religion as Everyday Life (Routledge, 2013). 
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